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Abstract
We take a new look at the question of the Arab democratic exception by looking at the preference for democracy among
individuals in the Arab world in a comparative context. We use the new sixth wave of the World Value Survey, which was
collected between 2012 and 2013, andwhich included for the first time 12 Arab countries (up from only four in wave 5) and
68 non-Arab countries. We innovate empirically by measuring the preference for democracy over strong rule in a way that,
we argue, is more adapted to an understanding of the Arab world than other measures used in past studies. Our statistical
analysis reveals a democratic gap in the Arab region compared to global experience, which is especially marked among the
more educated individuals, and to a lesser extent among the youth and the middle class. We conclude by discussing the
reasons that may explain the Arab exceptionalism, and argue that it is unlikely to be related to culture alone.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we re-open the debate about a possible
cultural bias against democracy in Arab countries. The in-
terest in understanding the political culture of the Arab
countries as a group has risen among policy makers and
social activists because of the failure of the popular up-
risings of 2011 to deliver political change, and the po-
litical chaos that has ensued. There are also more ob-
jective reasons to look at the Arab countries as one
group because of the cultural, political, and economic
similarities between them. On the cultural side, the re-
gion shares one language and has one dominant religion.
The development of a regional Arab media, and the in-
creased movement of migrants throughout the region
have facilitated the movement of ideas. On the politi-
cal front, “presidents for life” had entrenched autocratic
regimes in all countries, save Lebanon (Owen, 2014). Fi-
nally, the economies of Arab countries have been domi-
nated by the logic of rents extraction and distribution—
oil, geopolitical, and regulatory—which have fostered
crony relations between state and business that have
taxed growth and impeded global integration (Cammett,
Diwan, Richards, & Waterbury, 2015; Chekir & Diwan,
2014; Henry & Springborg, 2010). These similarities have
revealed themselves most starkly during 2011, when
protests in Tunisia led quickly to protests across the Arab
world, led by similar political demands for more free-
doms, dignity, and economic opportunities.
Our goal is to assess whether citizens in Arab coun-
tries desire democracy as much as otherwise similar in-
dividuals in the rest of the world. We take advantage of
new data released by the World Value Survey (WVS) as
its 6th wave, which was collected during 2011/2013, and
Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 16–26 16
which included 12 Arab countries, and 75 non-Arab coun-
tries.1 This is in contrast theWVS’s 4th and 5th waves, col-
lected around 2000 and 2008, which only included 5 and
4 Arab countries respectively. The new dataset allows for
the first time to compare values in a sizable share of the
Arab world to values around the world.
The literature focusing on the individual support for
democracy in the Arab world is thin. Most existing work
concerns the relationship between support for democ-
racy and Islam. While some researchers such as Fish
(2002), have found that there is a Muslim democratic
deficit, other researchers conclude that at the level of
individual preferences, there is no particular democratic
deficit connected to beingMuslim, whether Muslims are
compared to individuals of other religions in heteroge-
neous societies (Hofmann, 2004), whether individuals of
various levels of piety are compared in Arab countries
(Tessler, 2002a, 2002b), or whether one compares indi-
viduals in Muslim societies to individuals in other soci-
eties (Norris & Inglehart, 2002). Tessler (2002a) and Ja-
mal and Tessler (2008) show, using Arab Barometer data
(which is limited to Arab countries), that individuals in
Arab countries have a strong desire for democracy, es-
pecially among the youth and the educated, but these
studies do not compare the intensity of this demandwith
that emanating from individuals around the world. In-
deed, the literature does not look at an Arab specificity
in a comparative context largely because micro-data on
values covering a large set of Arab countries and interna-
tional comparators were, until recently, not available.2
Besides using a richer dataset, this paper innovates
methodologically in several respects. First, it looks at the
Arab values in comparison to global values. Second, it
asks whether individual characteristics such as educa-
tion, young age, middle class status, and low religios-
ity are as “emancipative” in terms of democratic pref-
erences in the Arab world as in the rest of the world.
Third, we use a new measure of the “preference for
democracy” which we argue is more instructive for the
Arab context compared to measures used by other re-
searchers in comparative studies such as Inglehart and
Welzel (2005, 2010).
Our empirical work reveals that individuals living in
Arab countries do have a lower preference for democ-
racy compared to otherwise similar individuals living in
other countries at similar levels of development.We find
that the deficit is especially large among the educated,
followed by the youth, and themiddle class, and it is only
explained in small part by the higher extent of religiosity
exhibited in the Arab region.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
how tomeasure the preference for democracy. Section 3
evaluates empirically the existence of an Arab excep-
tion. Section 4 asks whether this exception is connected
with different socio-economic groups. Section 5 looks
at civic action. Section 6 conducts robustness tests, and
section 7 concludes by discussing the reasons that may
be driving these preferences.
2. Measuring the Preference for Democracy, and
Comparing Arab Citizens with the Rest of the World
We first discuss how to measure individual prefer-
ences for democracy. Admittedly, democracy is a multi-
dimensional concept than cannot be reduced to a single
variable—there are many forms of it, and people may
have different understandings if it.3 In this paper how-
ever, we do not focus on the type of democracy peo-
ple aspire to, but rather, on their ranking of democracy,
as they understand it, with an alternative regime. When
simply asked to rate their (unconstrained) preference
for a democratic order, Arabs, like most people around
the world, express a high demand for democracy, and
especially so among the youth and the educated indi-
viduals (Tessler & Gao, 2005). To get a finer measure,
onemustmeasure not just individuals’ “raw” support for
democracy, but also their rejection of non-democratic
alternatives—Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 253) sug-
gest that some people may not be “solid democrats”
if their support for democracy is offset by parallel sup-
port for authoritarian regimes.4 Jamal and Tessler (2008)
look at this issue more closely in the Arab world. Based
on Arab Barometer data, they show that a significant
number of individuals polled in the Arab region sup-
port both democracy and strong rule. Indeed, when the
opinion poll questions become more qualified (for ex-
ample, would respondents favor a quick or gradual shift
to democracy, or whether in spite of problems, democ-
racy is better than other political systems), responses be-
comemore ambiguous (Jamal & Tessler, 2008). They con-
clude that while many people in the Arab world support
democracy in principle, they seem to want to see it im-
plemented gradually, out of a fear that democracies are
poor at maintaining order.
A measure of “net” support for democracy is pro-
vided by Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2010), who, us-
ing WVS questions, subtract from a variable measuring
democratic aspirations (“how important is it for you to
live in a country that is democratically governed?”), a
measure of individual preferences for autocracy (“as a
1 These are: Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq,Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Qatar, Yemen, Kuwait, and Libya. TheWVS interviews 1000–3000 individual
per country using polling methods that are meant to produce nationally representative samples.
2 In particular, Gallup data does not include good measure of democratic aspirations, PEW does not have a detailed list of the respondents’ characteris-
tics, and the Arab Barometer, which has a deeper coverage of issues surrounding democracy and political Islam, does allow for comparisons with the
rest of the world.
3 And indeed, there is a literature that tries to characterize individual understandings of democracy using various questions related to whether it would
be good for the economy, whether it should entail income redistribution, or whether it tends to favor political stability. See for example Cifti (2010) on
these issues, for the Muslim countries covered by the WVS.
4 Inglehart and Welzel (2005) also show this “net” measure behaves better than the “gross” measure of preferences for democracy in terms of its corre-
lation globally with measures of effective democracy.
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way of governing your country, what do you think of hav-
ing a strong leader who does not have to bother with par-
liament and elections”).5 Below,we refer to thismeasure
as NetDemo.
We think however that this definition is too blunt in
defining “solid democrats” in the Arab world. It may well
be that many Arabs are looking for relatively managed
elections as described by Jamal and Tessler (2008), but
that this does not necessarily push them to support au-
tocrats “who do not bother with elections”.6 We prefer
tomeasure the (relative) preference for democracy with a
variable that allows respondents to rank their preference
for democracy relative to “strong rule”, but not to such
an extreme form of autocracy. Ideally, such a measure
would also allow respondents to directly rank alternatives
(rather than subtract two ordinal values), and it would rely
on more than one question in order to reduce noise.
We have developedwhat we argue is amore adapted
measure to the circumstances where both a full democ-
racy and a repressive autocracy are likely to be viewed by
many as undesirable. We compute our measure, which
we call “preference for democracy” (PfD), by using 3 ques-
tions in the WVS that ask respondents to rank the val-
ues provided in 3 separate menus, where each menu in-
cludes at least one value connected with democratic ide-
als (“people have more say in how things are done”, “giv-
ing people more say in important government decisions”,
“protecting freedom of speech, progress towards a less
impersonal and more humane society”) and one with au-
thoritarian (but not openly tyrannical) preferences (“mak-
ing sure the country has strong defense forces”, “main-
taining order in the nation”, “the fight against crime”).
Our measure is also ordered: we rate higher individuals
who rank values connected with democracy above those
associated with security more frequently.7
Table 1 shows the basic statistics for DemoNet, PfD,
and their constituent variables: democratic aspirations,
and support for strong rule. We also include a mea-
sure of democratic grievances (DemoGap), a variable
used extensively byNorris (e.g. Norris, 2011), whichmea-
sures the difference between the answers to a question
about the strength of democratic aspirations (“how im-
portant is it for you to live in a country that is demo-
cratically governed?”), and an assessment of the cur-
rent situation (“how democratically is your country be-
ing governed today?”). Demo gap measures an aspect
of the demand for democracy different from DemoNet
and PfD: the gap between the extent to which some
people like the idea of democracy, and their assess-
ment of how democratic their country actually is. People
may have large democratic grievances (so DemoGap will
be large), and yet, when asked to rank democracy and
strong rule/autocracy, they may still prefer the latter (so
PfD or DemoNet would be small).
The three variables DemoNet, DemoGap, and PfD
measure different aspects of the demand for democracy.
It turns out that while the PfD average is lower in the
Arab sample relative to the rest of the world (3.0 versus
3.75 average score on a scale of 10), the average of De-
moGap and DemoNet are larger in the Arab world.
In order to try and understand the character of this
regularity, it is useful to examine how these 3 variables
are distributed along various socio-economic groups in
the Arab and global samples. To do so, we develop below
5 Answers to each of these questions are a number that represent the respondent preference between two extreme possible answers, typically over a
(1–10) range. This allows developing various measures of gap by subtracting two variables.
6 Moreover, themeasure treats two ordinal variables as cardinal by subtracting them and expecting the difference to be ordered.While the use of ordinal
values cannot be avoided in statistical analysis of opinions, it should be minimized, especially for dependent variables.
7 For a precise description of how the PfD variable, and other variables used in the paper, are constructed, see the appendix.
Table 1. Summary statistics (Global and Arab Datasets, Individual Level, waves 5 and 6).
Arab countries ROW All
Obs. mean SD Obs. mean SD min max
Preference for democracy (PfD) 23036 3.00 2.52 135591 3.75 2.58 1 10
Democratic deficit (DemoGap) 14027 3.27 3.37 125479 2.08 2.75 −9 9
Democratic gap (DemoNet) 18660 3.76 4.24 120884 3.51 3.96 −9 9
Strong Leader 21348 4.54 3.36 125641 4.90 3.05 1 10
Demo aspirations 21044 8.44 2.15 131341 8.40 2.03 1 10
Demo satisfaction 14177 5.14 2.75 126447 6.31 2.44 1 10
Protest 19725 2.89 3.13 122210 3.78 3.19 1 10
Civic engagement 23183 3.67 2.70 144948 3.60 2.64 1 10
Interest in politics 22467 5.13 2.67 161948 5.12 2.60 1 10
Age 24507 38.27 14.21 138431 42.30 16.84 15 99
Education 24471 2.63 1.03 137600 2.94 .78 1 4
Religiosity 24574 .76 .42 138759 .35 .48 0 1
Inc1 23684 .18 .38 129599 .18 .38 0 1
Inc2 23684 .23 .42 129599 .20 .40 0 1
Inc3 23684 .24 .43 129599 .28 .45 0 1
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several sets of multi-level regressions that explain varia-
tions in democratic values PfD in relation to variations
in individual characteristics, in both the global and Arab
samples, following the form:
PfD = aA + bB + cC + error (1)
Where the matrix A describes individual characteristics,
B is a set of country level variables (GDP per capita, time
dummies); and C describes the population under study
in various ways (dummies for all Arab countries, or for in-
dividual Arab countries). For ease of interpretation of the
resulting estimated coefficients, we use simple Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) techniques (while recognizing that lo-
gistical models would be more adapted to the task), and
all variables have been standardized.8
Our individual controls include age (15–90), educa-
tion (classified at four levels), religiosity, gender, and in-
come. We measure income with dummies variables (rel-
ative to the richest group) to allow for non-linearities of
the income effect—in particular, themiddle class may be
more democratic than both the richer and poorer part of
the population, as found by Diwan (2013) in the case of
Egypt. Religiosity is measured relative to the values peo-
ple want to inculcate in their children, in order to avoid
gender biases that would arise if we used instead the fre-
quency of attending religious services (since women are
not bound to participate in the five daily prayers in Islam).
Precise definitions are in the annex.
It is usually believed that values reflect culture and
change slowly. A key weakness of opinion polls is that
they measure opinions at a particular moment in time,
and that these measurements can be influenced by par-
ticular events, and end up as non-representative of the
true underlying values. In order to both measure the
recent state of values, but attempt to neutralize short-
term fluctuations, we pool data from the 5th and 6th
waves, which span the period 2000–2013. As a result,
our data covers about 160,000 individuals in 80 coun-
tries, of which about 25,000 individuals in 12 Arab coun-
tries.9 The WVS sample size in each country/wave tends
to be reasonable and representative (1000 to 3000 re-
spondents). Answers to questions are typically over a
range (1–10), allowing us tomeasure the intensity of par-
ticular values.Most of the questionswe use span the two
last waves. Whenever we have constructed indexes that
use the responses to several questions, factor analysis
was conducted to ensure that all the variables entered in
the index have one unique factor.
3. Arab Intercept Effect
We start by investigating the differences between De-
moNet and PfD. In the base regression, A includes indi-
vidual characteristics (age, education, gender, income,
religiosity), B includes only GDP per capita and a time
dummy, and C includes an Arab region dummy and its
interaction with time.10
The results (in Table 2, columns 1 to 3) of the esti-
mation of A accord with the main findings of Inglehart
andWelzel (2005), which follow the “modernisation” ap-
proach (Lipset, 1959) in finding that education, as a core
emancipative value, drives the preference for democ-
racy. Indeed, we find that both measures of democratic
values rise with education. The effect of age and income
are however different. DemoNet rises with age, while
PfD is higher among the youth. This is an important differ-
ence, as the first result does not accordwell with thewell-
established claimof themodernization school of thought
according to which younger generations should be more
emancipated (Ingleheart &Welzel, 2005). In addition, we
find that DemoNet has no relation to income, while PfD
is highest among the lower middle class, another desir-
able feature in light of the same literature on the role
of the middle class in consolidating democracy. The PfD
measure differs from DemoNet in two other ways—it de-
creases with religiosity, and it is higher among females,
relative to males (but both effects are small). Finally, the
effect of development, asmeasured by lnGDPc is positive
and significant for PfD (again, as suggested bymoderniza-
tion theory) but not significant for DemoNet. Thus, our
PfD variable behaves in more intuitively appealing ways
than DemoNet on several important accounts. The vari-
able DemoGap behaves in ways similar to DemoNet with
respect to age and education.11
What of the Arab exception? The results in Table 2
show again important divergences among the two mea-
sures. DemoNet shows the Arab region as having a pre-
mium for (net) democracy of +10%, as suggested by the
simple averages discussed above, while our variable PfD
shows a deficit of 8%. DemoGap also shows a premiumof
14%. Since we are using standardized forms for our vari-
ables, with a mean of 0 and an SD of 1, this should be in-
terpreted as a gap of 8% below the global average (which
is 3.75—see Table 1), expressed in terms of units of stan-
dard deviation of the global distribution of PfD (which
is 2.58). Note that this estimated democratic deficit is
smaller than that suggested by the raw averages in Ta-
ble 1. This must be due to net composition effects, the
Arab region being much more religious and a bit less ed-
ucated than the global average, two factors that reduce
PfD (but it is also younger, which creates an offsetting
positive effect on PfD).
The Arab premium connected to DemoNet is ex-
plained by the fact that while Arab citizens have slightly
higher democratic aspirations compared to individuals
around the world (column 5), their demand for a hard au-
8 Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
9 We have left Bahrain out, as we have found its data to be overly biased towards educated citizens and thus not to be reliable.
10 The time effect in the Arab region is given by the Arb1 dummy, which refers to the 4 countries with data in waves 5 and 6 (which are Morocco, Egypt,
Jordan, and Iraq), multiplied by a wave 6 dummy variable. It thus shows the trend among these 4 countries between waves 5 and 6.
11 Although this is less of a concern since there is no presumption that grievances should behave like core values with respect to modernization—see
Norris (2011, p. 243) on this.
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tocratic rule is way below that of the rest of the world
(ROW)—see column 4. The special dislike for a hard auto-
cratic rule among Arabs is probably related to the catas-
trophic history of dictators in the region. On the other
hand, their DemoGappremium is due to the fact that they
rate their regimes as less democratic than in the ROW(col-
umn6). This again is understandable, since their countries
are indeed much less democratic than other countries
around the world (Freud & Jaud, 2013). In effect, these
results indicate that more than in the ROW, Arabs aspire
for bothmore democracy and less autocratic rule, as they
have too little of the first and too much of the second.
But when asked to rank democracy and strong rule
(and not hard autocracy), our result in Table 1 indicates
that many Arabs tend to prefer the latter, even when
they dislike hard dictators.12 As a result, they end up be-
low the global averages on PfD, even though they regis-
ter a premium on the measure of unconstrained aspira-
tions (DemoGap), and of hard autocracy (DemoNet), as
if these end up choosing among the lesser of evils. For us,
this tension between aspirations and a hard reality is at
the heart of the Arab autocratic specificity.13 In the rest
of the analysis, we will focus on the PfD variable to mea-
sure the preference for democracy, as we believe that,
based on the results above, this variable characterizes
Arab preferences regarding the type of regime they as-
pire to in a finer and more useful way than the net mea-
sure DemoNet of Inglehart and Welzel (2005).14
It can be noted that while we have weak evidence
for the movement of Arab opinions over time, since they
are restricted to four countries, PfD took a small hit after
the 2011–2012 uprisings in the 4 countries in the sam-
ple, dropping by 3% on average (but not significant), but
at a time when the global trend was also negative. If
this trend was applied to the sample of 12 countries, in
wave 5, just before the “Arab Uprisings”, the gap must
have been of a similar magnitude.15
4. The Effect of Individual Arab Characteristics on PfD
The country-wide level differences that we have ob-
served above between the PfD of citizens of Arabs
countries and the rest of the world may reflect differ-
ences among all citizens, or they may be due to differ-
ences among particular socio-economic groups. Identify-
ing such group differences would help in characterizing
better the Arab specificity. We thus extend the results
of Tables 2 by looking more in depth at the Arab specific
effects of individual characteristics on PfD by adding an
Arab dummy variable interacted with individual charac-
teristics in the regression model. These effects will mea-
sure possible deviations from the global norms. To recall,
we had found that within the global sample, PfD is higher
among the middle class (Inc2), the youth, and the edu-
cated. Is the structure of individual preferences for PfD
different in Arab countries? It is clear from Table 3 that
the answer is Yes, and that the main ways in which the
Arabworld is different are, in order of importance, the ef-
fects of education, and then of age and class, which are
all less emancipative with respect to PfD than in the rest
12 The correlation coefficient between PfD and Strong Leader is −0.15 in the Arab world, indicating that while these two values are not that closely
connected.
13 Jamal and Tessler (2008) relate this Arab specificity to a special concern about instability. See our interpretation in the concluding section.
14 We are however not making the case that our measure is always superior to DemoNet. It may be the case that when focusing on other countries or
regions, where political opinions are polarized between democrats and populists, the latter measure is more useful.
15 This is consistent with the findings of Tessler and Robbins (2014) who shows, based on Arab barometer micro-data that cover eight Arab countries,
that the uprisings of 2011 have not affected preferences for democracy in significant ways.
Table 2. Global determinants of preference for democracy (PfD), with Arab intercept effect.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PfD DemoGap DemoNet Strong Demo. Demo. Protest Civic Interest
[5-6] [5-4] Leader aspiration satisfaction engagement in politics
age −0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** −0.02 0.07*** 0.00 0.09*** −0.02 −0.04**
education 0.06*** 0.13*** 0.08*** −0.04* 0.10*** −0.07*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13***
female 0.01 −0.01*** −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 0.01* −0.10*** −0.08*** −0.08***
religiosity −0.02 −0.00 −0.01 0.01 −0.00 0.01 −0.00 −0.03 −0.01
inc1 −0.00 0.08*** −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.11*** −0.05*** −0.05*** −0.03**
inc2 0.02** 0.04*** −0.00 −0.01 −0.02** −0.07*** −0.04*** −0.02 −0.01
inc3 0.01 0.03*** −0.01 −0.01 −0.02*** −0.06*** −0.02*** −0.02 −0.01
lngdpc 0.11*** −0.05 0.05 −0.05 0.02 0.09* −0.06* 0.21*** 0.08**
ARB −0.08** 0.14*** 0.10** −0.11*** 0.05* −0.13** 0.05 −0.08 −0.03
wave6 −0.05* −0.02 −0.12*** 0.09** −0.10*** −0.05 −0.03 −0.13*** −0.08**
w6*ARB1 −0.03 0.02 −0.07 0.09 0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05*** −0.06**
N 141914 126530 126217 132087 137278 127428 146730 131104 127652
adj. R2 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.05
Notes: OLS, uses WVS waves 5 and 6. Standardized beta coefficients. Variables are defined in the annex. ARB is a dummy for 12 Arab
countries included in wave 6. ARB1 is a dummy for the four Arab countries included in wave 5. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010.
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Table 3. Determinants of PfD in Arab countries, with Arab specific slope effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PfD DemoGap DemoNet Strong Demo. Demo. Protest Civic Interest
[5-6] [5-4] Leader aspiration satisfaction engagement in politics
age −0.06*** 0.03*** 0.05*** −0.02*** 0.07*** 0.03*** −0.01** −0.01 0.09***
education 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12*** −0.08*** 0.11*** −0.02*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.11***
female 0.00 −0.02*** −0.00 −0.00 −0.01*** 0.01*** −0.06*** −0.06*** −0.10***
Religiosity −0.02*** −0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02*** −0.01*** −0.03 −0.01
inc1 0.01*** 0.07*** −0.00 −0.01*** −0.02*** −0.10*** −0.01*** −0.04** −0.06***
inc2 0.02*** 0.05*** −0.00 −0.02*** −0.03*** −0.07*** −0.01** −0.02 −0.05***
inc3 0.01*** 0.03*** −0.01*** −0.01 −0.03*** −0.06*** −0.01* −0.01 −0.03***
lnGDPc −0.33*** 0.44*** 0.16*** −0.29*** 0.02 −0.39*** 0.48*** 0.19*** −0.07**
ARB 0.11* −0.20*** 0.03 −0.03 −0.04 0.15*** −0.11 0.14 −0.15*
Age*ARB 0.03*** 0.01 −0.03*** 0.02*** −0.03*** −0.04*** −0.05*** −0.05** 0.01
Edu*ARB −0.07*** 0.01 −0.05*** 0.05*** −0.03** −0.03** −0.12*** −0.13*** 0.16**
Fem*ARB 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01** 0.01** −0.06*** −0.04** −0.00
Relig*ARB −0.00 0.02*** 0.04*** −0.03*** 0.03*** −0.01** 0.02** −0.00 0.01
inc1*ARB −0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** −0.01*** 0.00 −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.02 0.02
inc2*ARB −0.02*** −0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.03**
inc3*ARB 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01*** −0.02 0.01
N 141914 126530 126217 132087 137278 127428 127761 132019 145178
adj. R2 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.04
Notes: See notes in Table 2. Also include time dummies (not shown). Standardized beta coefficients. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.010.
of the world (as the variables have been normalized, the
size of the effects can be directly compared in our regres-
sion results). As noted above, a fourth factor that stands
out is religiosity, because of a large compositional effect,
rather than because religiosity influences values in the
Arab region differentially.
First, the effect of education on PfD is very much
muted in the Arab region (+3% = +10% − 7%) relative
to the rest of the world, (+10%). This means that as an
individual moves from uneducated to being a university
graduate, which is about 4 SDs on the education scale
(see Table 1), her PfD rises by 40% globally, but only by
12% in the Arabworld—a very large difference. It is note-
worthy that there is a similar, albeit smaller effect for
Gap 2, the measure on preference for democracy rela-
tive to a hard autocracy. Thus, as in the ROW, education
emancipates, but it does so much less in the Arab world
compared to the global experience, resulting in low na-
tional averages on PfD. The result that education eman-
cipates politically in the Arab world is not new (Jamal,
2006; Tessler, 2002), but that it does so much less than
elsewhere is.
Second, the effect of young age on PfD is smaller in
the Arab region than in the rest of the world—the net
Arab slope relative to age is -3% (−6% + 3%), compared
to a global slope of −6%.16 So for example when compar-
ing a person in her 20s, with another in her 60s (about 3
SDs on the age scale), holding all other personal charac-
teristics at their global means, the young would have an
excess on PfD relative to the old of 18% in the ROW, and
only of 9% in the Arab region. Here too, the new result is
not that youth are more emancipated in the Arab region
compared to the old, but that they are less so compared
to global experience.
Third, the effect of religiosity is significant, negative,
and similar in the Arab region and in the ROW, but this
translates into a larger PfD gap in the region given that it
is much more religious than the ROW (.76 versus .35 on
a scale of 0–1, see Table 1). Here, the results are differ-
ent from those in Hofmann (2004), Jamal (2006), Tessler
(2002a), andHassan (2008), who all find that the effect of
religiosity on the PfD is small and insignificant in Muslim-
majority countries. Here, we find this effect to be nega-
tive (and small), but in ways similar to the ROW—these
differences are likely to be due to differences in the sam-
ple and/or in our measurement of PfD.
The income effect, which is evident in the global sam-
ple, is neutralized in the Arab region, which has only a
small upper middle class effect. In particular, the lower
middle class group (Inc2) has a 2% premium on PfD in
the global sample, but a zero premium in the Arab region.
Thus, while it may be that it was the middle classes that
mainly supported democratic ideals during the regional
uprisings of 2011 (Diwan, 2013), they still fell short of the
intensity ofmiddle class support for democracy observed
in the ROW. Finally, women are found to be more pro-
democracy in the PfD sense thenmen in the Arab region,
but not in the ROW, with a small differential of 1%.
16 In contrast, the relation between age and DemoNet, themeasure on preference for democracy relative to a hard autocracy, goes the other way around,
as if older individuals are more comfortable with hard autocracy.
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What is the relative contribution then of age, educa-
tion, class, and religiosity in explaining the Arab gap? Let
us consider for simplicity that Arabs have the same dis-
tribution of age and education as in the ROW, but that
religiosity is one SD above the global situation (which is
close to reality—see Table 1). Let us then compare the
attitudes to PfD of its main champion—a young, highly
educated, lower middle class (LMC) individual, with av-
erage religious beliefs. Let us pick then a LMC youth of
about 25 years old (with about one SD below the global
average age, i.e., of age 43.3–16.8), that goes to univer-
sity (this corresponds to a rating of 4 which is again close
to an education level about one SD above the global aver-
age: 2.94+.78). The global educated youth is estimated
to have a surplus on PfD, relative to an average global in-
dividual (i.e., with all variables are at the mean of their
global distribution, the normalized PfD measure is 0) of
18 points (+6+10+0+2). The Arab educated youth, with
a religiosity level set at the Arab average, would have
an excess of PfD relative to an average global citizen
of 4 points (3+3−2+0).17 The PfD difference between
the Arab and global educated LMC individuals is thus 14
points (18-4), which can be decomposed into the differ-
ential effect of education (7), age (3), religiosity (2), and
LMC effect (2). Clearly, the education effect swamps each
of the other three effects.
5. Civic Action and Protest
Are the lower levels of PfD in the Arab countries that we
have uncovered above associated with lower level of po-
litical involvement? The question is worth asking given
the seeming contradiction between our results on the ex-
istence of a democratic preference gap, and the scenes
of demonstrations and protest witnesses in major Arab
cities during 2011–2012 (a period that falls between the
WVS waves 5 and 6). To try to elucidate this contrast,
there are several questions related to political involve-
ment in the WVS that can be looked at here. We focus
on three variables—interest in politics, participation in
demonstrations, and a broad index of civic action thatwe
construct and that encompasses four questions related
to the extend to which respondents have participated
in a demonstration, signed a petition, voted, or joined
a boycott.
It turns out that there are no level differences in the
Arab world relative to the ROW—the level Arab dummy
is not significantly from zero in Table 2 (columns 7 to 9).18
But are there differences in the participation of particu-
lar groups in political activities? To answer this, we look
at the slope effects associated with our 3 variables (Ta-
ble 3, columns 7 to 9). The results indicate that there are
important slope differences for education again, but not
for most of the other individual characteristics. Although
educated Arabs aremore interested in politics than their
global comparators (by +16%), they are not as engaged
politically (a gap of 13%), and they demonstrate less (a
gap of 12%) relative to similarly educated individuals in
the ROW. These large differentials run parallel to our re-
sults above on the PfD gap being especially large among
the educated, and it strengthens the notion that educa-
tion is not as emancipatory politically in the Arab world
as in the rest of the world. On the other hand, the results
in Table 3 also show that youth have participated more
in demonstrations than in the rest of the world (relative
to older individuals), which runs against their (small) rela-
tive gap on PfD, pointing towards the existence of other
countervailing influences, and requiring further investi-
gation.19
6. Robustness
We conclude by conducting robustness checks to see if a
few outliers countries in the Arab region drive the main
results found above, or whether these apply broadly in
the Arab sub-sample. To evaluate the particular country
effects, we rerun the PfD regression of Table 2, replacing
the Arab dummy by country dummies for each of the 12
Arab countries covered by the WVS, in order to measure
how far from the regression line each Arab country lies
(see Table 4). We find that all the countries of the region
are below the global “regression line” on PfD. The regres-
sions yield effects with the same signs as those in Table 2,
Table 4. Country specific effects on values (waves 5
and 6).
PfD DemoGap DemoNet
JOR −0.03** −0.03*** 0.09***
MAR 0.00 0.10*** 0.11***
EGY −0.03** 0.08*** 0.08***
LBN −0.01*** 0.01 −0.02***
PLN −0.01*** 0.03*** 0.00
QAT −0.04*** na na
TUN −0.05*** 0.09*** 0.00
LBY −0.08*** 0.08*** 0.02***
YEM −0.03*** 0.05*** 0.04***
IRQ 0.02 0.05*** 0.08**
DZA −0.02*** 0.02*** 0.04***
KWT 0.00 0.00 −0.02**
BHR −0.03** na −0.03***
N 133108 126530 127166
R2 0.04 0.05 0.05
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients. Also controls for all
individual characteristics, GDPc, w6, w6*ARB1.
17 The last term related to the compositional effect of religiosity is computed as follows for the educated young Arab: [0.76−0.35]/.48—see Table 1.
18 Table 2 also reveals that the variables “protest” and “civic engagement” (but not “interest in politics”) have fallen between waves 5 and 6 in the four
countries for which data exists over the two waves. This suggests that political activism was slightly higher during the period covered by wave 5 (and
was then higher than in the ROW).
19 These results confirm Tessler and Robbins (2014) results, based on Arab Barometer data, on the dominance of youth and the educated in protests in
Egypt, but they go beyond these by comparing their participation rates with those of similar groups in the ROW.
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when they are significant. We have also run Table 2
regressions for waves 5 and 6 separately (results not
shown). For PfD, there is no Arab effect in wave 5 (where
the sample is much smaller), and a stronger Arab effect
in wave 6. Thus the PfD regressions are broadly similar
across countries and periods, and the democratic gap un-
covered above applies to every Arab country in the sam-
ple, albeit with different intensities.
7. Conclusions
Our investigation found, using the WVS data, which cov-
ered 12 Arab countries and 68 non-Arab countries in
its 5th and 6th wave, that the Arab region did experi-
ence a democratic demand deficit around 2008–2013.
More specifically, when focusing on the Arab region in a
comparative perspective, we found that the demand for
democracy was stunted by a pro status quo bias which
was especially strong among the educated, but which
was also visible among the youth and the middle class.
What to make of these findings? The empirical liter-
ature concerned with democratization has largely com-
pared democratic performance across countries. As a
group, Arab countries have the lowest rating in theworld
on democracy indexes such as the Polity index (Freund &
Jaud, 2013). While this political specificity puts the Arab
world group quite apart from the rest of the world, the
prevalence of autocratic regimesmay be however totally
unrelated to individual preferences. Indeed, most politi-
cal scientists do not believe that individual preferences
have a great effect on whether a country ends up demo-
cratic or not, and instead, democracy is believed to arise
as an agreement among elites (Przeworski, 2010). Empir-
ically, researchers have found many country-specific rea-
sons, outside of individual preferences, why Arab coun-
tries have a democratic deficit (Diamond, 2010; Elbadawi
& Makdissi, 2010; Noland, 2005; Stepan & Robertson,
2003). Someof the factors that stand out include the exis-
tence of oil rents, which favor patronage and strengthen
autocracy (Ross, 2001), the effect of wars and the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict which has led to oversized armies
with an incentive to grab power (Elbadawi & Makdissi,
2010), and of external interventions in support of au-
tocrats (Stepan & Robertson, 2003). It may also be the
case that democratization is driven by changes in elite
bargains, but that chances of reversals to autocracy are
lower when a country’s democratic culture is stronger
(O’Donnel, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986).
We tend to believe that individual values matter for
regime type over the long-term. But in this paper, we
are more concerned about the formation of individual
preferences, and about whether these values are re-
lated to local culture, and thus are impervious to change,
or whether they are instead related to factors that are
amenable to be affected by particular policies. There is
an active debate on whether this “democratic exception”
is due to a cultural bias present in Arab and/or in Mus-
lim countries. While we do not dispute that local culture
can, to some extent, affect individual preferences for a
democratic order, we will argue that the weight of the
evidencewe have uncovered points towards a larger role
for political explanations, rather than towards essential-
ist claims.
The key question posed by our results is that of fig-
uring out the deeper reasons shaping the low demand
for democracy in Arab countries. Several possible logi-
cally coherent interpretations suggest themselves—the
exception we have uncovered could conceptually be due
to differences in culture, but also to differences in inter-
ests, circumstances, or active policies by autocratic gov-
ernments to influence individual preferences. While the
results in this paper cannot claim to disentangle these
different reasons, they can at least help in making some
informed speculations.
First, what do our results say about the possibility
that Arab culture is inimical to democratic ideals? In
our data, the neutralized effect of education on political
emancipation predominate—in the example we have de-
veloped, it explains half of the democratic gap. The cul-
tural factor is unlikely to explain the blunted impact of
education in the Arab world, as local culture would be
expected to affect the uneducated more than the edu-
cated, which are typically more connected to global than
to local values (Norris, 2011). Moreover, if we think of
Arab culture in terms of its surplus of religiosity, a pos-
sible characteristic of followers of Islam, it is apparent
that in this sense also, the contribution of Arab culture
to the Arab democratic gap, which we have found to ex-
ist, is small.
Which of the remaining hypotheses aremore promis-
ing? It could be that individuals associate democracy
with regime change, which they fear because of the prob-
able chaos that such a transition would entail, especially
in their environments where autocrats had worked hard
at not facilitating such transitions.20 If this was a pre-
dominant factor, it might possibly explain the democratic
gap among the lower middle class individuals, which can
be particularly vulnerable to economic shocks, but there
seem to be no particular reasonwhy it would particularly
affect the educated and the youth.
A fear of income redistribution argument is also un-
convincing. If it was the fear of democratic governments
acting to the benefit of the poor and redistributing in-
come away from the rich that led to a low demand for
democracy, we would have expected larger differences
among the upper middle class and the rich, which we do
not observe in our data.
There are two remaining arguments that one finds in
the democratization literature that are potentially more
in sync with our observations. It could be the case that
20 The extreme case being in Libya where Kaddafi had made sure that no single institution remained. Jamal and Tessler (2008) favor this interpretation.
They argue that fear of instability is related to both the geo-strategic situation of the region (particularly in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Algeria), and to
actions by rulers to ensure that regime change would bring disorder and divisions, as a means to block the demands for political change.
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the youth, the educated, or the middle class, have an
interest in the preservation of the status quo if they
expected a more democratic regime to deliver Islamist-
dominated governments that would reduce their civic
rights. This could be at the heart of the late version of
the autocratic bargain that has managed to keep aging
autocrats in power after the failure of their economic
performance became clear in the 2000s. To check this
hypothesis in more depth would require that the atti-
tudes of these groups towards political Islam be looked
at more carefully.
Finally, the existence of large democratic gaps among
educated individuals could be either due to the fact that
the educated have done particularly well in the last two
decades, and/or to the ability of long-lived autocratic
regimes to manipulate educational and cultural institu-
tions in ways that bias individual values to favor their
rule. These hypotheses, while attractive a priori, would
be hard to check empirically in the Arab world, given the
low level of variation in political regimes, and would re-
quire a broader global investigation into the relation be-
tween regime type and the extent of support by the ed-
ucated for pro-autocracy values.
Trying to disentangle these hypotheses further is an
important agenda for future research. But our results
suggest already that rather than focus on immutable cul-
ture as the main constraint to changes in values, one
needs instead to focus on what can be done on the pol-
icy front. In this respect, education emerges as an area
where the focus of reforms should concentrate not just
on its quality from an economic productivity perspective,
but also, from the social and political qualities it embod-
ies as well.
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Preference for democracy (PfD). This variable uses responses to the question: “People sometimes talk aboutwhat the aims
of this country should be for the next ten years. In each of the 3 menus listed below, which option you consider the most
important? And which would be the next most important?” PfD is defined as the number of times democratic principles
(M1: 3; M2: 2; M3: 2 or 3) are listed ahead of security interests (M1: 2; M2: 1, M3: 4).
Menu 1
1. A high level of economic growth;
2. Making sure this country has strong defense forces;
3. Seeing that people have more say about how things;
4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.
Menu 2
1. Maintaining order in the nation;
2. Giving people more say in important government decisions;
3. Fighting rising prices; 4. Protecting freedom of speech.
Menu 3
1. A stable economy;
2. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society;
3. Progress toward a society in which Ideas count more than money;
4. The fight against crime.
Democratic Aspirations: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?
Democratic satisfaction: How democratically is this country being governed today?
DemocraticDeficit (DemoGap): Constructed as the differencebetweendemocratic aspirations anddemocratic satisfaction.
Strong Leadership: Would having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections be a very
good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?
Democratic Net preference (DemoNet): The difference between democratic aspirations and strong leadership
Interest in Politics: Average of 2 variables: (i) How important is Politics in your life? (ii) How interested are you in politics?
Civic Engagement: Average value of 4 variables: Have you ever: (i) Signed a petition”; (ii) Joined in boycotts”; (iii) Attended
peaceful demonstrations; (iv) voted.
Participation in Demonstrations (protest): Have you ever: “Attended peaceful demonstrations”?
Independent Variables
Age: the scope of this variable is restricted to 15–99.
Education: A 1–4 scale where 1 stands for people who no education, 2 for individuals with at most have a primary school
diploma, 3 for people who have more than primary school and less than university education and 4 for people who have
at least started a university program.
Female: Takes a value of 1 for female and 0 for male.
Income: Inc1, Inc2, and Inc3 are dummy variables related to the 3 first quartiles of the income distribution respectively,
relative to the group in the richest fourth quartile.
Religiosity:Whether religious faith is an important child quality.
Lngdpc: Logarithmic value of GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 international $), for the year in which the survey was
done (World Bank Indicators).
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